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Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) are our primary border defense against nuclear 
smuggling, but are they still the best way to spend limited funds? The purpose of this 
research is to strategically compare RPM defense at the border with state-side mobile 
detectors. The challenge of an adequately detailed smuggling network problem is that 
the number of variables required to adequately capture the problem also makes the 
problem computationally exhaustive. A well bounded problem, although simple, can 
provide meaningful information to a decision-maker. Limiting the problem to a 
comparison of two technologies, a decision-maker can prioritize how to best allocate 
resources, by reinforcing the border with stationary Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) 
which can be perceived, or by investing in Mobile Radiation Detection Systems (MRDS) 
which are harder for an adversary to detect but may have other weaknesses. An abstract, 
symmetric network is studied to understand the impact of initial conditions on the 
network, and the most conservative choices are made in an asymmetric network loosely 
modeled on the state of Texas transportation system. This asymmetric network is then 
examined for the technology that will maximally suppress the adversary’s success rate at 
minimal cost. We conclude that MRDS, which have the advantage of discrete operation, 
outperform RPMs deployed to a border. We also conclude that MRDS maintain this 
strategic advantage if they operate with one-tenth the relative efficiency of their 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
“The danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global security [1]” 
  
This thesis examines the payoffs of continued investment into the infrastructure 
of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) contrasted by diversifying into Mobile Radiation 
Detection (MRDs).  Analysis of a transportation network, which already has a RPM 
component, will demonstrate that investment in mobile radiation detection, rather than 
additional RPMs, is a superior defense against non-state actors.   
Nuclear terrorism and the threat thereof is a new phenomenon, even considering 
the youth of nuclear technology in general.  Traditionally, terrorists do not inflict 
massive harm on civilians, instead choosing enough violence to shock the public without 
completely repulsing potential supporters.  Traditional terrorism is a form of drama, or 
psychological warfare whose victims are the viewing audience rather than the casualties 
[2].  Traditional terrorist groups have finite goals and objectives that demand selective 
targeting and calibrated force.  The goal of this drama is not to inflict maximum 
casualties but to win public support and erode confidence in the state [3].  The massive 
casualties of a nuclear weapon do not interest traditional groups, and even the threat of 
one for purposes of blackmail or ransom are too costly and uncertain [2].        
Conversely, non-traditional groups may not have finite or even realistic 
objectives.  These groups may not need public support.  Indeed, they often do not even 
want it.  Such terrorists are primarily interested in lashing out against society for 
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perceived wrongs and inflicting the maximum amount of pain and suffering on their 
enemy [4].  For these groups nuclear terrorism may be an option. 
   
1.A.  Characteristics of the Nuclear Terrorist 
The aspiring nuclear terrorist is very likely a non-traditional actor.  The actor of 
interest is a small cell or a large, organized group.  Lone actors may have an interest in 
nuclear terrorism, however, because of their limited capabilities and resources their 
probability of conducting a successful attack is diminishingly small.  There are three 
generally accepted pathways by which a non-state adversary might acquire a nuclear 
weapon – state transfer of a weapon, material, or components; theft; or manufacture – 
none of which can be accomplished by a lone actor.  History supports this.  For example, 
a study of 45 radiological and nuclear terrorist plots by Ackerman et. al. demonstrates 
that nuclear terrorism is the purview of small cells and large, organized groups [5].   
The probability of state sponsorship is generally considered to be extremely low 
[6].  The state sponsor would have to be either reckless, desperate, or unusually 
confident in the terrorist organization because the cost of having a weapon attributed 
through intelligence or forensics is nuclear retaliation [7].  The threat of retaliation 
serves as a significant deterrent for potential sponsors – even those who typically 
sponsor terrorism or traffic in conventional weapons [8].   
Weapons are generally well protected because the state depends on secure 
weapons to maintain deterrence capabilities.  Sophisticated weapons contain advanced 
security features such as a permissive action links (PAL) – a built-in security measure 
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that prevents unauthorized detonation.  However, even less sophisticated weaponry is 
generally kept in secret facilities and well protected, sometimes with financial and 
technical assistance from other powers with a vested interest in nuclear security (such as 
the United States assistance providing PAL assistance to Pakistan under the Bush 
administration) [9].  
The most probable pathway for a terrorist to acquire and use a nuclear weapon is 
to manufacture an improvised nuclear device (IND) using fissile material and a crude 
triggering device to initiate a chain reaction.  An IND would be significantly less 
powerful than a state device, but could still produce a yield equivalent to some kilotons 
of dynamite.  Therefore, the theft and trafficking of nuclear material is a significant 
concern and is specifically addressed as the greatest threat to global security in 
America’s counter terrorism strategy [1].  
Acquiring fissile material is considered by many experts to be the most difficult 
step for the aspiring nuclear terrorist.  However, the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database 
contains 16 incidents of trafficking in uranium or plutonium between 1993 and 2011 
[10].  Because the IAEA is not an investigative body and only reports numbers that 
states are willing to confirm, the actual number of trafficking incidents may be higher.  
While none of these incidents alone poses a threat, it does demonstrate nuclear 
trafficking is real and with it the possibility (likely or not) of nuclear terrorism.  
Although the probability of a nuclear event is highly unlikely, the high consequences 
associated with it means that the United States has good reason to invest in infrastructure 
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to detect and deter non-state adversaries who may choose to execute a nuclear option on 
American soil.   
 
1.B.  Security Infrastructure 
American nuclear security is a multi-stage process that begins with enhancing 
security of foreign nuclear material, and therefore denying nuclear material at the source.  
That security extends to detection, interdiction, and response at the borders of foreign 
nations and continues to America’s borders where RPMs can detect nuclear materials 
moving through the border.   
RPMs are passive systems that can detect nuclear and radiological materials in 
vehicles, containers, and on persons passing through them.  There are a number of 
different configurations for portal monitors; however, the most common configuration is 
double-sided where two detectors are placed on opposite sides of a controlled lane to 
scan objects of interest [11] (Figure 1). Single-sided systems are less common because 
they are less effective.  Even less common are multi-sided systems where the object of 
interest is enclosed on three or more sides for scanning.   
First generation RPMs were composed of helium-3 tubes used for neutron 
detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) and polyvinyl toluene (PVT) plastic slabs 
to detect gamma radiation.  These RPMs still compose the bulk of RPMs deployed to the 
U.S. border [11].  However, the helium-3 shortage has forced manufacturers to find 
alternative solutions, such as boron-10 lined ZnS(Ag) scintillators developed for neutron 





Figure 1.  Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) in an exit lane. This RPM uses a standard 
double-sided configuration. Reprinted from “United States Customs and Border 
Protection’s Radiation Portal Monitors at Seaports.” Error! Bookmark not defined.  
 
Secondary components process and calibrate the electronic signals from the 
detectors to discriminate passive background radiation, minimize false alarms, and 
communicate true positives to security personnel.  The geometric configuration, physical 
components, and software settings means there is some variance in detector capability 
from one to the next.  However, ANSI standards set a maximum false alarm rate (less 
than 1 in 1000 occupancies) and a minimum true positive rate (at least 59 of 60 
occupancies) [13]. Manufacturers are often capable of exceeding these standards [13], 
but may advertise minimum detectable quantities in an ideal environment where very 
few detectors have the luxury of operating.    
Vehicles and persons that produce an alarm are sent for secondary screening.  If 
secondary screening verifies a signal, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
officers use hand-held detectors to isolate, locate, and identify the source.  The complete 





Figure 2.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP) process for resolving alarms. 
Reprinted from “United States Customs and Border Protection’s Radiation Portal 
Monitors at Seaports” [11]. 
 
Improvements in technology and the commercialization of radiation detectors 
have made mobile radiation detection systems (MRDs) another option that can support 
security.  Mobile systems are housed in trucks, vans, or SUVs that can be deployed to 
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major thoroughfares or surged to protect a potential target, interdicting actors that have 
breached the border.  
 
1.C. Nuclear Smuggling Network Modeling 
A number of network interdiction models have been developed and studied over 
the last decade.  In his seminal work, Wood developed a deterministic model for 
analyzing commodity smuggling wherein an interdictor with limited resources seeks to 
minimize an adversary’s commodity trafficking across a capacitated network [14].  
Wood demonstrated that even this basic problem, solving for the interdictor’s cost-
effective investment, is computationally exhaustive.  Although this model was designed 
for commodity smuggling, such as drugs or weapons, Wood’s observation is still 
informative in analyzing nuclear smuggling and necessitates a practical and measured 
examination of any network.  Wood coped with these limitations by developing a new 
integer programming model, however, this model needs bulwarking if the network is 
sufficiently complex. Additionally, while this does significantly decrease computational 
time, a given network may still be too computationally exhaustive to study. 
Recent studies have had success in studying networks that were sufficiently well-
defined or limited in scope as a way of coping with uncertainty.  Dimitrov et al. 
constructed a stochastic network where an interdictor installs detectors on a network that 
are transparent to a nuclear-smuggler [15]. The smuggler seeks to evade detection while 
the interdictor seeks to minimize the smuggler’s probability of success.  Dimitrov copes 
with the computational challenge that Wood discovered by inverting the data stream, 
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turning the unknown resources that Wood tried to calculate into a known input instead.  
Under a known threat scenario, with known detection probabilities, this stochastic model 
plots the most effective deployment of detectors.   
Cheng et. al. demonstrated the viability of a mobile sensor network where simple 
radiation detectors are mounted in vehicles [16].  Cheng limits the scope of the problem 
with a mobile system that is extremely dense, approximately 3,000 units to cover the 
island of Manhattan; using non-detection probabilities that fall within a specified range 
and which preclude challenges associated with varying shielding; and with perfect 
knowledge of where every sensor is located at any given time.  The model is not 
comprehensive but does provide a clear indication whether such a system is 
advantageous to pursue as a practical exercise.   
While some effort has been invested in strategies to quantify the uncertainties 
surrounding an adversary[17], very little attention has been paid to the uncertainties 
associated with the interdictor.  Simply put, too many models assume the interdictor has 
perfect knowledge of the network.  Israeli and Wood acknowledge that adversaries may 
have access to pathways that are immune to the influence of an interdictor [18].  The 
number of cross-border tunnels that have been discovered in recent years to smuggle 
narcotics into the United States – more than 140 of them between 1990 and 2012 – is 
evidence enough that Israeli and Wood were correct [19].  A practical model must 
consider that there may be nodes and pathways that the interdictor cannot influence or 
may not even know exist.  At the very least, the problem must be constrained such that 
the interdictor can never have perfect certainty of the smuggler’s network.    
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Haphuriwat et al conclude that in the absence of perfect knowledge and perfect 
detection capability, the only successful strategy is one that compensates for imperfect 
detection capability (and knowledge) with a sufficiently credible threat of retaliation 
[20].  Certainly the United States has invested in advertising its capabilities and its 
policy of retaliation toward a nuclear strike.  However, it can also benefit from at least 
understanding the uncertainties associated with the problem of nuclear smuggling and 
thereby improve its ability to detect and deter potential adversaries.  
A comprehensive model may be intractable, however, a model that examines a 
particular scenario can be sufficiently limited to provide a solution that is informative for 
decision makers; for example, the placement of detectors along the U.S. border given a 
fixed budget and detectors of a known capability [15].  Assumptions and simplifications 
make models less realistic but are necessary to make models computationally tractable 
and informative.  Alternatively, these models can be solved by breaking down a single 
network problem into a series of independent submodels [21]. Even this effort requires 
some measure of assumption and simplification to aggregate information from the 
submodels into a coherent strategy.   
The research presented in this work makes several assumptions and 
simplifications, justified by the narrow scope of the research objective, and by the 
computational limits of comprehensive network modeling. These assumptions include a 
network model where the adversary has access to routes which are immune to the 
interdictor’s influence, where the interdictor’s detection capabilities are known with 
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certainty, but the adversary’s success is uncertain and expressed as a probability. These 
assumptions and the scope of this research are detailed below. 
 
1.D.  Research Objective 
This thesis is concerned with inferring decisions associated with the following 
question:  Given an existing infrastructure with imperfect coverage of the border, and 
given an adversary of sufficient technological and conventional capabilities to attempt a 
nuclear smuggling operation, are decision-makers best served with continued investment 
into stationary RPMs deployed along the border or investment into mobile units 
operating within U.S. borders? 
We limit the problems typically associated with network modeling by framing 
the problem as one of relative utilities.  Will RPMs effect adversary failure more than 
MRDs?  What is the break-even point where neither option is preferred?  Quantifying 
the true impact of one system or another on an actual network is not the scope of this 
project.  Instead this thesis is concerned only in answering which option outperforms the 
other on a strategic level.   
Neither does this project attempt to solve the challenge of uncertainty for the 
interdictor, although it does acknowledge that any model that depends on perfect 
knowledge is theoretical and deeply flawed for practical purposes.  This project 
addresses interdictor uncertainty by modeling the adversary’s transportation network, 




2.  THE SHIELD NETWORK INTERDICTION MODEL 
The strategic problem of analyzing a transportation network can be examined 
with a modeled network composed of nodes and pathways[15].  Nodes represent specific 
physical locations such as airports, border crossings, seaports, etc.  Whereas pathways 
represent a transportation path available to an adversary vis-à-vis roadways, rail, boat, 
etc. that connects two nodes.  Nodes are the end-points and midpoints for all pathways, 
representing entry points into the network, the target destination, and midpoint 
opportunities (such as junctions or a change in transport).  A simple network is 
illustrated in Figure 3.  Nodes are denoted by circles and pathways are denoted by 
arrows showing the direction of flow across the network.  Node 1 is the origin and Node 
3 is the target or destination, while Nodes 2 and 4 are intermediary nodes that may 
represent a change from one roadway to another, or even from one vehicle to another 
such as with a port. 
 




SHIELD is a code developed by Jun Luo at the Nuclear Security Science and 
Policy Institute (NSSPI) to analyze the strategic problem of nuclear smuggling.  An 
input deck provided by the user generates a network with a starting node, a target node, 
and a network of intermediary nodes and pathways.  The user specifies the non-detection 
probabilities associated with each node and pathway where the non-detection probability 
is the probability that an adversary will not be detected when traversing an element of 
the network.  Each node and pathway has an associated perceived non-detection 
probability (Per nPD), which is used to calculate the adversary’s preferences in routes; 
conversely the actual non-detection probability (Act nPD) is used in calculating the 
adversary’s expected success in traversing the network. 
The network can be constructed with varying parameters for different types of 
adversaries.  A sophisticated adversary will assess the entire network and prioritize 
routes that have the highest overall chance for success; whereas an opportunist will 
proceed step-by-step across the network, selecting pathways based on the path of least 
resistance immediately available.  Other adversary types, such as insiders, are not 
modeled in SHIELD; however, it may be possible to account for them either in the 
network itself or by perturbing the non-detection probabilities of select nodes and 
pathways.  Failure is measured simply by the adversary’s interdiction before reaching 
the target node.   
SHIELD linearizes all routes across the network, eliminating low probability and 
zero-success routes in favor of high success routes until the code has the user-defined 
maximum number of routes. A Monte Carlo method is used to determine the adversary’s 
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successes and failures across multiple routes.  SHIELD then aggregates the successes 
and failures of the adversary across all routes of interest to calculate the adversary’s 
overall success, expressed as a percentage of attempts.   
A sample input deck can demonstrate the set-up and limitations of SHIELD.  A 
full input deck for a sample network can be found in Appendix A, while Figures 4 and 5 
below are excerpts from the sample network.  Figure 4 illustrates setup information for 
the SHIELD input deck.  Run number is the number of runs that SHIELD will execute. 
HEU quality is the enrichment of material, and container type quantifies the level of 
shielding in the surrounding container - these are not working features of SHIELD yet, 
however source and shielding can be accounted for simply by setting the actual non-
detection probability to the expected value. The print controls simply determine what 
information is printed in the output file.  The second command line contains behavior, 
routes, and seed inputs.  Behavior determines if the adversary is intelligent (0) or 
opportunist (1) which governs the manner in which they traverse the network (as above).  
The routes number is the maximum number of routes that SHIELD will linearize for 
sampling.  The random number generation starts from a seed value.  If the same seed is 
selected, then SHIELD will produce the same results on the same model.  Seed method 
can be set to either a 0 or 1, which will determine if SHIELD uses a seed value from the 
clock to generate random values, or if it uses a fixed seed value.  Layers are used for 
back-calculating a maximum success rate for the adversary.  After completing a run, 
SHIELD can perturb layers of the network within the range of values assigned to 
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optimize the network for a given success rate.  The final command line simply tells 
SHIELD the number of nodes in the network and which node is the target node.   
 
 
Figure 4.  Excerpt of a sample input deck header for SHIELD.  This excerpt includes 
setup information for the network. 
  
Figure 5 contains an excerpt from the body of the sample input deck.  The first 
command line includes all relevant information for a node, starting with the “N” 
designation for node and an assigned number.  The perceived non-detection probability 
(Per nPD) determines the adversary’s behavior whereas the actual non-detection 
probability (Act nPD) determines the adversary’s success or failure.  For a sophisticated 
adversary these values may be the same (as demonstrated below).  Forward paths tells 
SHIELD how many paths to anticipate flowing forward from the node, time is the 
number of hours the adversary is held at the node, and redirect probability is the random 
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probability that the adversary will be redirected to an alternate route rather than staying 
on course. Origin and locations are strictly for the user’s convenience.  Latitude and 
longitude are used in plotting the network on SHIELD’s graphic interface; these can be 
used to calculate the real distance along paths or ignored and used exclusively for the 
user’s convenience. 
 Below the node command line are all pathways moving forward from that 
particular node.  Pathways are denoted by the “P” command, in the first column, with an 
initial and ending node.  Distance can be set by the user in miles, or as described above 
can be calculated using the shortest geodesic for a globe.  Time is the number of hours 
that the adversary is on the path.  Pathways have a perceived and actual non-detection 
capability just as nodes do.   
 
 
Figure 5.  Excerpt of a sample input deck body for SHIELD.  This excerpt includes 
information on the network's nodes and pathways. 
 
 It is worth noting several features of SHIELD’s operation.  Time is summed for 
all nodes and pathways on a single route.  This data is then aggregated for all attempts, 
yielding an average time for the adversary’s interdiction (in the case of failure) or an 
average time for the adversary to completely traverse the network (in the case of 
 
 16 
success).  This has no direct impact on the adversary’s success or failure and may best be 





3.  ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE NETWORK 
The goal of this work is an informative, comparative analysis of two networks. 
This work is not intended to be fully comprehensive, but instead to inform a single 
choice. In order to address the question meaningfully, assumptions have been made to 
create a solvable network model.   
RPMs are modeled as nodes in a border region with a static detection probability 
greater than zero.  It is assumed that all RPMs have the same detection probability.  This 
is not actually true.  Variations exist between detector types, software, geometry, and the 
procedure for implementation.  These are not trivial differences in the lab, but are 
considered insignificant for the strategic problem of determining adversary preferences.   
For all RPMs the detection probability is assumed to be 0.98 based on ANSI 
standards[22], and therefore the non-detection probability is 0.02.     
MRDS are modeled as pathways with a detection probability greater than zero.  
The detection capability of MRDs is assumed to be equivalent to that of RPMs, because 
ANSI standards for both systems are exactly identical for the purposes of evaluating a 
system non-detection probability [22], [23].  However, MRDs have significantly less 
control over geometry and implementation than RPMs because of the manner in which 
they are used, which may include discrete operations.  Therefore, this thesis also 
considers a range of possible values for MRD efficiencies relative to RPMs, such that:   
 




where PMRD is the detection probability of the MRD unit, PRPM is the detection 
probability of the RPM unit, and 𝜀 is the fractional difference in efficiency between an 
RPM which operates in practically ideal circumstances, and the MRD which does not. 
MRDs are modeled as a detection capability on pathways of the network.  MRDs 
are centered on a node inside the border and traverse adjacent pathways feeding in or out 
of this node.  It is assumed that the MRD has no downtime and that there is an equal 
probability that the MRD unit will be deployed to any of its adjacent pathways.  The 




where n is the number of adjacent pathways.  Therefore, the non-detection probability 
for a pathway is: 
 





where βi,j is the non-detection probability of a pathway connected to deployment node i 
and node j, ni is the number of paths connected to deployment node i, and PMRD is the 
detection probability of the MRD unit.   
An illustration of MRD modeling is provided in Figure 6 below.  Node 2 is the 
deployment node (i).  The adversary can only move forward toward the target (denoted 
by arrows), but the mobile unit can be positioned on any adjacent pathway.  All 
pathways moving in or out of the deployment node are potential routes (n) for the MRD 
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and will have a non-detection probability determined by the formula given above.  For 
an ideal system where the MRD has perfect detection capabilities 𝛽1,2 = 0.333.     
 
Figure 6.  Sample deployment node and pathways. Node 2 is the deployment node for 
an MRD unit. Pathways 1-2; 2-4; and 2-5 will have an increased detection capability as a 
result. 
 
This thesis is a comparative assessment of two technologies, and therefore our 
primary focus is how these technologies impact the strategic problem of nuclear 
smuggling.  RPMs and MRDs operating in the field do not have the idealistic non-
detection probabilities assumed here.  Because this research is a comparative assessment 
of two technologies it is not necessary to perfectly characterize these probabilities. 
Instead, we only need to characterize them relative to each other, and the baseline ANSI 
standard does that.  
Additionally, because this is technological assessment, it is assumed that RPMs 
and MRDs dominate the non-detection probabilities associated with the network.   In 
truth, the non-detection capability of a real network at any given point is a confluence of 
technology, law enforcement, and other factors.  Quantifying the indigenous non-
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detection probability of law enforcement is challenging because it depends on a number 
of factors that vary based on the behavior of the adversary or state agencies.  Routine 
traffic stops can be used to derive an expected value for the effectiveness of indigenous 
law enforcement when there is no actionable intelligence or information about the 
adversary.   
In 2011 the Department of Justice reported approximately 10.2% of the nation’s 
212.3 million drivers were targeted by a traffic stop [24].  That averages to 0.028% of all 
drivers per day, assuming of course that all drivers operate a vehicle daily.  This 
assumption is not realistic and the probability of a traffic stop occurring in a single day 
for the adversary is virtually zero.  A more realistic approach would examine the length 
of the smuggler’s trip because the longer the smuggler is in the open the greater the risk.   
The Department of Transportation reports that the average driver is on the road 
13,476 miles annually [25].  If only 10.2% of 212.3 million drivers are subject to a 
traffic stop, the average driver will cover 132,118 miles before being stopped, which is 
roughly equivalent to driving the breadth of the continental United States 37 times.  It 
can be argued that the average driver is not a nuclear smuggler, and the smuggler may 
share risk-tolerant characteristics consistent with drivers who are stopped more 
frequently.  Adults aged 20-34 drive 15,098 miles per year [25]Error! Bookmark not defined., 
make up 12.7% of all drivers but account for 22.5% of all traffic stops[24].  The 
expected number of miles between traffic stops for a driver between the ages of 20 and 
34 is 83,992 miles, which is still far too high to be useful in a model where the adversary 
is unlikely to travel even 1,000 miles because high-value targets (namely cities) tend to 
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be close to physical borders, or ports, or both.  Unless any given route varies 
considerably in length, by three or more orders of magnitude, the indigenous detection 
probability will be overwhelmed by random error associated with the sampling 
technique.   
Therefore, indigenous detection probabilities are not considered in this model.  
The non-detection capabilities for this network were calculated exclusively from the 
capabilities of RPMs and MRDs.  Nodes and pathways that were not supported by RPMs 





4.  ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ADVERSARY 
This thesis considers the most conservative case – an intelligent adversary that is 
technically sophisticated, capable, and well-funded.  It is assumed that such an adversary 
can effectively assess the border for RPMs and minimize exposure by exploiting 
smuggling routes and illegal entry points to cross the border – see Figure 7 for an 
example of the overt nature of RPMs.  Such an adversary is unlikely to be a lone-wolf or 
an opportunist, whom RPMs are well situated to detect.  Instead this thesis considers the 




Figure 7.  U.S border crossing with RPMs. RPMs are clearly visible in blue. The overt 
nature of an RPM at a border crossing means it is trivial for an adversary educated on 





Intelligence and conventional capabilities are modeled in the adversary’s ability 
to perceive and rank-order routes across the whole network rather than traversing the 
network step-by-step.  Technical sophistication is modeled as the ability to accurately 








Per is the adversary’s perceived non-detection probability for node j and βj
Act is 
the actual non-detection probability of node j. 
It is also assumed that an intelligent adversary may be informed to the presence 
of MRDs on the network, but is not capable of identifying placement.  MRDs can be 
housed in low-profile automobiles that would make identification very difficult.  Further, 
MRDs may be deployed to a number of potential sites and thoroughfares that can be 
challenging to scout and plan around.  A rational actor may assume there is an equal 
probability that an MRD is deployed to any given route.  This may influence the 
decision to go nuclear, but it does not help the smuggler avoid detection because all 
routes are equally attractive and equally not.  For pathways that do in fact house MRD 
capability, the perceived non-detection probability (βi,j
Per) will always be less than the 
actual non-detection probability (βi,j









5.  NETWORK SETUP 
 
A strategic analysis was conducted on two networks – a simple symmetrical 
network and a more complicated asymmetrical network.   Each network was composed 
of four different regions – pre-border, border, principality, and target (see Figure 8).   
 
 
Figure 8.  A sample network with four regions.  
 
 
The pre-border region represents materials outside the border and is used strictly 
to position material for movement across the border region.  The United States has 
invested heavily in the Second Line of Defense that places RPMs and other capabilities 
in foreign states with the hope of limiting nuclear trafficking.  For the purposes of this 
analysis the pre-border region had no detection capabilities to ensure that simulations 
tested only one variable. 
The border region represents entry points into the state and is composed of legal 
border crossings with simulated RPMs and illegal “holes” which have zero-detection 
capability.   The default network has 80% coverage across the border, and legal entry 
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points are nodes with a perceived and actual non-detection capability of two percentError! 
Bookmark not defined.: 
𝛽𝑗
𝑃𝑒𝑟 = 𝛽𝑗
𝐴𝑐𝑡 = 0.02 
The principality region represents pathways and opportunities available inside 
the border en-route to the target.  The default non-detection capability for all pathways 
and nodes in the principality region is unity.  The target region is composed of a single 
node that the adversary must reach.  The target node does not change.  Additionally, the 
target node does not possess any detection capability because the model does not allow 
the adversary to deviate or pursue any course that does not eventually bring them to the 
target node.  Any detection capability on this node is not actually a deterrent and 




6.  SYMMETRIC NETWORK 
A symmetric network was analyzed to better inform the creation of an 
asymmetric network. An asymmetric network better represents the reality of a 
transportation network, where variance creates chokepoints, break-out opportunities, and 
other complications. However, the model may be highly sensitive to not just the 
mapping, but also the distribution of legal and illegal entry points. To explore the impact 
of that distribution, a symmetric model was created.  
The symmetric network was coded into three variations to analyze the system’s 
sensitivity to the initial distribution of holes in the border region – this analysis would 
then inform the creation of the asymmetric network.  The initial construction of the 
network, without holes, is shown in Figure 9.  This new network is composed of 40 
border nodes (30 legal entry points and 10 illegal holes), 10 principality nodes, a single 
origin node, and a single target node.  The holes in the border region were distributed 
randomly, uniformly, and in large clusters to measure the network’s sensitivity to these 
initial conditions.  These three networks are called Random, Uniform, and Clustered 
respectively.  The Random distribution was created using a random number generator 
for node assignments in the border region. The Uniform distribution has holes 
distributed evenly alongside legal entry points. The Clustered distribution has half of the 
network’s holes at the top of the border region (but not on the edge) and the other half at 




Figure 9.  Symmetric network.  RPMs are denoted by R and Holes are denoted by H.  
The Border Region is duplicated five times, connecting to each "A" node in the 
Principality region.  The border in its entirety is composed of 40 nodes. For pictorial 
sakes, only 8 of the 40 border nodes are shown. 
  
These initial network variants were then subjected to a battery of tests to 
determine if variables such as distance, time, or redirect probability would affect the 
adversary’s success rate. The results of this sensitivity analysis concluded that perturbing 
these values did not change the outcome of the model, which was expected.  The 
sensitivity analysis did determine that the network was sensitive to the network’s 







6.A.  Radiation Portal Monitors 
 
The network was first tested for the sensitivity of RPMs on the initial distribution 
of holes.  Holes in the border region were filled piece-wise at random and tested, until all 
holes in the border region were closed by RPMs.  An initial test using standard non-
detection probabilitiesError! Bookmark not defined. had nearly identical results for all three 
variants (Table 1). Results varied by at most 0.20 of a percent, which is attributed to 
random error in Monte Carlo sampling. In Table 1 (below), supplemental RPMs have a 
negligible effect on adversary success rate until there is one hole in the border region. 
With one hole in the border region, adversary success drops to 92.7 percent. A pathways 
analysis revealed that this was because SHIELD must aggregate a particular number of 
routes, defined by the user, and in this scenario with only one entry point, the simulation 
had to include suboptimal routes for the adversary that would typically be avoided – 
those with a detector. While these routes were minimized, it still impacts the aggregated 
results, which accounts for the 92.7 success rate. When RPMs are ubiquitous in the 
border region, then adversary success drops to 2.0 percent, which is simply the non-


















40 100.0  40 100.0  40 100.0 
10 100.0  10 100.0  10 100.0 
9 100.0  9 100.0  9 100.0 
8 100.0  8 100.0  8 100.0 
7 100.0  7 100.0  7 100.0 
6 100.0  6 100.0  6 100.0 
5 100.0  5 100.0  5 100.0 
4 99.5  4 100.0  4 99.5 
3 99.2  3 99.2  3 98.7 
2 97.2  2 97.2  2 97.1 
1 92.8  1 92.7  1 92.6 
0 1.9  0 2.0  0 2.0 
 
Table 1.  Symmetric network RPM sensitivities. RPMs are insensitive to the initial 
distribution of illegal entry points.  Three network variants have nearly identical results. 
 
In Table 2, additional tests were run with an increased non-detection probability 
of 0.05, to determine if this pattern was driven by the network’s layout, rather than a 
sampling error.  The same patterns emerged. Supplemental RPMs made an impact when 
there was only two holes in the network. This difference is primarily attributed to the 
increased non-detection probability. This decrease in the rate of success when there are 
only two holes occurs because, like above, SHIELD needs a minimum number of routes 
and aggregated results from suboptimal pathways. When there are no illegal entry 
points, the adversary’s success is equal to the RPMs non-detection probability – variance 




From these results it is concluded that supplemental RPMs are insensitive to the 
initial distribution of holes in the border region; the variance in adversary success rates is 
attributed to random error in the sampling process.   
 













40 100.00  40 100.00  40 100.00 
10 100.00  10 100.00  10 100.00 
9 100.00  9 100.00  9 100.00 
8 100.00  8 100.00  8 100.00 
7 100.00  7 100.00  7 100.00 
6 100.00  6 100.00  6 100.00 
5 100.00  5 100.00  5 100.00 
4 98.87  4 100.00  4 98.86 
3 98.00  3 98.06  3 96.62 
2 93.49  2 93.46  2 93.45 
1 84.06  1 84.19  1 84.20 
0 4.91  0 5.06  0 4.95 
 
Table 2.  Symmetric network with increased non-detection probabilities. RPMs with an 
increased non-detection probability of 0.05 are equally insensitive to the initial 
distribution of illegal entry points.  Three network variants have nearly identical results. 




In all cases, the presence of RPMs only mattered when the holes in the network 
were below a certain threshold (Figure 10).  There was no appreciable difference 
between a network with 35 RPMs and zero.   Above that threshold, adversary failure 
increased slowly, with the most appreciable difference occurring when the network was 
completely closed off from illegal entry points.  At that point it was functionally 
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impossible for an adversary to successful traverse the network, with a success rate based 
strictly on the possibility of a false-negative in the detector.  This result is expected but 
not informative for practical purposes; it is impossible to say with certainty that every 
illegal entry point can be (and will continue to be) closed off to an adversary.  What 
matters to decision-makers is the impact of RPMs on a porous border; unfortunately, 




Figure 10.  Impact of RPMs. Supplementing the network with additional RPMs has a 
negligible impact on adversary success.  Additional RPMs do not have measurable 
impact until they are ubiquitous. 
 
 
6.B.  Mobile Radiation Detection Systems 
 
A single MRDS was added to each of the network’s base variants – Random, 
Uniform, and Clustered – with 10 holes in each network. MRDS were assigned to each 



































Position 42 93.36 93.38 93.19 
Position 43 93.30 93.22 93.15 
Position 44 93.51 87.31 78.07 
Position 45 85.41 87.70 93.11 
Position 46 73.63 78.24 93.24 
Position 47 83.15 86.70 93.23 
Position 48 90.21 87.34 78.26 
Position 49 89.90 77.33 53.29 
Position 50 84.62 88.91 93.21 
Position 51 64.77 74.23 93.18 
Min  64.77 74.23 53.29 
Max  93.51 93.38 93.24 
Average 85.19 85.44 86.19 
 
Table 3.  One MRDS on the symmetric network. A single MRDS has a significant 
impact on the adversary’s success. Here, data is aggregated from all three variants of the 
network, and across all principality nodes.  
 
 
These initial tests proved that mobile units are highly sensitive to positioning.  A 
single mobile unit, with an equivalent detection capability to an RPM, reduced the 
adversary’s success by as little as 6.49 percent and by as much as 46.71 percent. The 
initial distribution of illegal entry points does not impact the success or failure of MRDs 
in the aggregate.  The average success rates for adversaries on the Uniform and Random 
networks were within a quarter of a percent.  The Clustered network has a difference of 
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as much as one percent (compared to the Random distribution).  However, this can be 
attributed to a bias in SHIELD’s culling procedure. 
The Clustered network has the largest variance in adversary’s success. This 
variance can be attributed to the modeling software and is not characteristic of the 
configuration itself. The Clustered network has holes distributed into two large clusters 
(Figure 11), one at the top and one at the bottom of the network. In Figure 11, dotted 
lines represent optimal routes favored by the adversary because they pass through a hole. 
There are the same number of these pathways at the top and bottom of the network. 
However, it so happens that SHIELDs procedure for picking and culling routes is 
numerical. SHIELD captures routes starting at the top of the network, and once it has 
reached the maximum number of routes, culls the rest. Routes at the bottom of the 
network tend to be culled. When positioning an MRDs at Position 51 (see Figure 11), the 
routes that might pass through this area tend to be culled, while routes at the top of the 
network, where there is no detection, are picked. The adversary’s success rate of 93.18 
percent for this position is inflated because of this. Overall, this increased adversary 
success in the Clustered network, however the increase is not real, but instead is an 
unintended consequence of the algorithm inside SHIELD.  
Conversely, MRDS positioned at nodes 44, 48, and 49 have a minimum. These 
minimums exist because these MRDS are deployed close to target where a large number 
of routes pass through. While the adversary starts on the edge of the network where the 
hole clusters are, some routes cut through the middle to reach target, where they are 
detected by the MRDS deployed there.  
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Figure 11.  Clustered network pathways. The Clustered Distribution of illegal 
entry points in the Symmetric Network. RPMs are Squares. Holes are Circles. Dotted 
lines are entry-routes favored by an adversary because they pass through a hole. Position 





Additional simulations ran for a scenario with two MRDS and three MRDS on 
the network. MRDs were not assigned to duplicate nodes, however MRDs could be 
assigned to adjacent nodes resulting in an overlap in their routes and a greatly reduced 
non-detection probability across a single pathway (see Figure 12).  Overlapping routes 
were treated as independent probabilities and follow the product rule for independent 
events.  MRDS were not sampled across all potential combinations and deployment 
positions. Instead, a sample was taken, with deployment nodes chosen at random.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Overlapping MRDs routes. Nodes 3 and 4 are deployment nodes for MRDs.  
Pathways 3-4 (dashed line) has a non-detection probability associated with two mobile 
units instead of one. 
 
 
 Multiple MRDS suppressed the adversary’s success rate even farther (Table 4 
and 5). This reduction is not constant, however, which is to be expected. On average, the 
first MRD reduced the adversary’s success by 14.39 percent (from Table 3).  On 
average, three MRDS reduced the adversary’s success by 26.38 (Table 5) when 
compared to a route with zero MRDS. While each additional MRDS is slightly less 
 
 36 
effective than the previous, each MRD has a signification impact on adversary success 
by reducing the number of routes which can be traversed safely. 
 
 Adversary Success Rate 
 Random Uniform Clustered 
Position 47 51 55.31 67.80 93.16 
Position 43 45 86.01 88.46 93.08 
Position 50 51 62.18 72.97 93.07 
Position 46 48 71.30 72.49 78.06 
Position 43 49 89.46 77.90 53.24 
Position 48 50 82.25 83.29 78.03 
Position 42 47 82.48 86.05 93.23 
Position 47 49 78.36 70.41 53.60 
Position 44 51 65.64 69.08 78.14 
Position 43 44 93.51 87.14 78.13 
Min  55.31 67.80 53.24 
Max  93.51 88.46 93.23 
Average 76.65 77.56 79.17 
 
Table 4.  Two MRDs on symmetric network variants. Two MRDS on each network 






 Adversary Success Rate 
 Random Uniform Clustered 
Position  43 44 51 67.47 69.94 77.96 
Position  42 48 49 87.96 74.69 44.9 
Position 44 48 50 83.14 77.74 63.06 
Position 48 49 50 80.45 70.51 44.97 
Position 42 47 51 55.76 76.49 93.22 
Position 42 45 46 70.01 79.29 93.11 
Position 42 47 48 78.75 62.09 78.13 
Position 44 47 51 55.48 71.59 78.18 
Position 43 46 47 63.27 81.27 93.06 
Position 42 45 47 75.06 67.9 93.15 
Min  55.48 62.09 44.90 
Max  87.96 81.27 93.22 
Average 71.74 73.15 75.97 
 
Table 5.  Three MRDs on symmetric network variants. Three MRDS further suppressed 
adversary’s success. Data is aggregated from all three variants of the network. Position 
combinations were chosen at random to get a sample.   
 
Once again, the Clustered distribution has a higher adversary success rate than 
Random or Uniform. This was again due to SHIELD’s preference for routes at the top of 
the network over those at the bottom (see Figure 11).  With three mobile units, this 
preference has compounded.  There is a difference of 1.41 percent between the Random 
and Uniform distributions, however this is still within the bounds of the model’s 
uncertainty.  
A Clustered distribution is the most conservative scenario, strictly because of this 
coding preference for top-of-network routes. However, this did not seem realistic. 
Therefore, we choose to proceed with a random distribution of illegal entry points when 
constructing the asymmetric network.  
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An initial comparison of RPMs and MRDs showed that MRDs were more 
effective at interdicting adversaries on the network.  RPMs had a relatively negligible 
impact on the network until they became ubiquitous, at which point it was functionally 
impossible for an adversary to successfully traverse the network (Figure 10 on Page 31).  
On average, RPMs effected anywhere between 0 and 8.4 percent (Table 1 on Page 29) 
change in the adversary’s success rate – as previously discussed this maximum is not 
real but instead is based on SHIELDs route culling algorithm which aggregates data 
from suboptimal routes. We therefore considered the impact of RPMs on the network 
without this data point. It would be more accurate to characterize the impact of RPMs as 
somewhere 0 and 3 percent.  Whereas equivalent MRDs effected an average 14.4 
percent change in the adversary’s success rate.  
Mobile units that enjoyed only a fraction of the efficiency of their stationary 
counterparts were still more effective than RPMs.  A test with MRDs that were one-half, 
one-third, one-quarter, and one-tenth as effective as RPMs demonstrated that one MRD 
was still more effective than a single RPM – and often more effective than several RPMs 
(Table 6).   
 𝜺 = 1 𝜺 = 0.5 𝜺 = 0.33 𝜺 = 0.1 
Random 85.19 88.70 90.31 92.33 
Uniform 85.44 88.90 90.53 92.50 
Clustered 86.19 88.79 90.40 92.74 
 
Table 6.  Perturbing relative efficiency of MRDs. Three MRDS further suppressed 
adversary’s success. Data is aggregated from all three variants of the network. Position 





7.  ASYMMETRIC NETWORK 
 
The asymmetric network was designed to better analyze the impact of MRDs on 
a network that does not possess the kind of idealized symmetry previously modeled.  
This network was inspired by, but does not exactly duplicate, the Texas state roadway 
system.   Previous simulation informed the construction of this network – illegal holes 
were distributed randomly in the border region to analyze a conservative and realistic 
scenario.  Entry points were reduced to 34 (instead of 40). The asymmetric network, 
with the initial distribution of holes and RPMs, is shown in Figure 13.  
The principality region was further divided into two parts – roadways and major 
thoroughfares.  Major thoroughfares were identified as pathways that fed into or out of 
major transportation hubs on the network, effectively creating choke points.  MRD 
assignments were restricted to nodes on thoroughfares. This restriction on MRDs was 
designed to better simulate an intelligent and strategic deployment, exploiting the natural 
bottlenecks that exist in a transportation system.  The network’s thoroughfares are shown 






Figure 13.  Complete asymmetric network.  RPMs are denoted by grey boxes and illegal 
holes are denoted by orange circles.  Through fares are denoted by bold pathways. MRD 






Figure 14.  Major thoroughfares in the asymmetric network. Thoroughfares feed into or 
out of critical transportation nodes on the network.  These nodes connect the border 
region to the larger network and to each other. MRDS deployments nodes are blue. 
 
 
7.A.  Radiation Portal Monitors 
 
The network was initially tested for the impact of additional RPMs; as in the 
previous model RPMs were added piece-wise to the border region and tested, until all 
holes in the border region were closed by RPMs.  Results from the asymmetric network, 
shown in Table 7, mirror its predecessor.  RPMs had a negligible impact on adversary 
success until they achieved full coverage of the border region, when there are zero holes. 




















Table 7.  RPMs on the asymmetric network. RPMs have a negligible impact on the 
adversary's success rate until they are ubiquitous. 
 
 
7.B.  Mobile Radiation Detection Systems 
MRDs were then tested on the asymmetric network, with a baseline of 34 entry 
points and 7 illegal holes (Figure 13).  MRDs were initially tested with comparable 
efficiency to RPMs.  MRDs were based out of major transportation hubs and deployed 
strictly to the major thoroughfares previously identified (Figure 14).  Additional MRDs 
were added to the network and tested as well.  As in the previous experiment, MRDs 
were never assigned to the same node but could overlap in the pathways that they 
covered.  Once again, overlapping routes were treated as independent probabilities.  
Eight trials were run, one for each MRDS deployment position in the network.  
Mobile units were highly effective in decreasing the adversary’s success rate 
(Table 8).  A single mobile unit of comparable efficiency to an RPM decreased the 
adversary’s success by 20.12 percent on average.  However, the variance in the 
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adversary’s success rate tells us that MRD performance is highly sensitive to placement.  
Mobile units decreased adversary success by as much as 33.44 percent and as little as 





Position 49 94.37 
Position 57 79.17 
Position 66  94.44 
Position 82 85.12 
Position 83 72.49 
Position 84 66.56 
Position 85 66.98 
MIN 66.56 
MAX 94.44 
AVERAGE 79.88  
Std. Dev 11.01 
 
Table 8.  MRDs on the asymmetric network. MRDs have a significant impact on the 
asymmetric network, decreasing the adversary’s success rate by 20.12 percent in the 
aggregate. Eight trials were run to cover all eight deployment positions, with 100,000 
simulations per trial.  
 
The most effective MRDS were those positioned close to target, or that had 
connection to all border entry points, even if there were alternative routes. Position 84 
and 83 were close to target. Both had routes to every illegal entry point. While there 
were also alternative routes where an adversary could have avoided the MRDS, this 
large footprint seems to be the key to the high impact on adversary success. Position 85, 
the Target, also had minimal adversary success for the same reasons. Conversely, 
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position 49 and position 66 had the smallest impact on the adversary. These positions 
covered only some of the illegal entry points into the network. Given the robust number 
of entry points and routes the adversary could take, these deployment positions simply 
did not have the kind of footprint that other deployment positions did.  
Additional mobile units were then added to the model, such that every 
deployment position was tested in combination with a secondary deployment position.  
This process was repeated, to test three MRDS on a single network.  Additional mobile 
units provided smaller non-linear returns, which is to be expected, but still had a large 
impact, upwards of 2.5 times the standard deviation, on the adversary’s ability to 
successfully negotiate the network.   Additional mobile units on the network have a 
measurable impact on the adversary’s success (see Table 9).  This thesis does not 
measure the impact of more than three mobile units on the network but does predict that 
as the population of MRDs grows, the adversary’s success will drop off logarithmically 
until approaching a minimum where every thoroughfare has been blanketed with 







 1 2 3 
MIN 66.56 44.76 34.00 
MAX  94.44 79.71 64.87 
AVERAGE 79.88 62.54 48.53 
Std. Dev 5.28 5.91 5.56 
 
 
Table 9.  Additional MRDs on the asymmetric network. Additional MRDs provide 
diminishing returns but have a profound impact on the adversary's failure rating. 
 
The relative efficiency of MRDS was perturbed and the simulations duplicated 
for a system in which MRDs possessed one-half, one-third, and one-tenth the detection 
capability of their RPM counterpart (See Table 10).  At one-tenth relative efficiency, the 
MRDS still impacted the adversary’s expected success rate by 2.37 percent. However, 
the wrapped up in this number (0.91 percent), overlaps with our results of a very 
effective RPM regime, which suppressed by adversary success by 2.2 percent, creating a 
conservative equilibrium point between these technologies. Unfortunately, it is very 
difficult to identify if we possess a highly effective RPM regime – one where a smuggler 
has very limited options for moving through illegal entry points – because the 
smuggler’s pathways cannot be fully known17. We can say that this is attainable and 
therefore a conservative equilibrium point, is identified as one where neither technology 
can be said to outperform the other with certainty.  An MRDS with a relative efficiency 
greater than one-tenth would outperform a RPM. At one-tenth it cannot be said that one 
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system outperforms the other. Below one-tenth, there does not appear to be a strategic 
benefit to MRDs.  
 
 
Position 𝜺 = 1 𝜺 = 1/2 𝜺 = 1/3 𝜺 = 1/10 
Position 49 94.37 91.34 93.96 98.24 
Position 57 79.17 89.12 93.21 97.26 
Position 66  94.44 97.00 97.93 99.38 
Position 82 85.12 91.48 94.19 97.98 
Position 83 72.49 85.06 89.61 97.07 
Position 84 66.56 82.41 87.59 96.43 
Position 85 66.98 84.13 88.99 97.02 
MIN 66.56 82.41 87.59 96.43 
MAX 94.44 97.00 97.93 99.38 
AVERAGE 79.88 88.65 92.21 97.63 
Std. Dev. 11.01 4.74 3.36 0.91 
 
Table 10.  Perturbing relative efficiency on asymmetric network. The average success 






8.  CONCLUSIONS 
Decision makers who wish to increase our capabilities against nuclear threats 
must weigh the payoffs of investing further into RPMs or diversifying into MRDS.  This 
thesis does not examine the costs associated with these choices, but it does examine the 
payoffs measured as a decrease in the success rate of a simulated adversary.  The work 
here demonstrates that MRDS have a significantly higher payoff.   Mobile units are 
discrete and while the adversary may be able to anticipate their presence, they cannot 
have the same confidence in their placement as a stationary (and fairly obvious) RPM.  
This manifests in decreased adversary success in a range of scenarios and MRDS 
efficiencies.   The overall results of this work demonstrate that the strategic problem is 
insensitive to the particulars of a network.   While the success rates may change the 
general trend is constant – MRDS are more effective.  
Perturbing the efficiencies of MRDS on the network presents a target threshold 
for manufacturers.   This work has examined MRDS with a relative efficiency of as low 
as 10% compared to RPMs.  Although ANSI standards make the two systems practically 
identical, execution in a real-world scenario may drop MRD non-detection probabilities.  
At one-tenth relative efficiency, MRDS are comparable to RPMs. Below this value, the 
effectiveness of the MRDS is too small and the uncertainties too large to say with 
confidence that it outperforms a robust RPM program with limited pathways for an 
adversary. There may still be tactical advantage to an MRDS at this efficiency because 
of mobility, especially when complimented with actionable intelligence, but that is 
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beyond the scope of this work.  We recommend that manufacturers aim for a system 
which has a non-detection capability one-tenth of an RPM or better, in a real-world 
application scenario.  
MRDS have a higher payoff than RPMs and are worth investing in. While the 
costs associated with each system is not the focus of this work, it is worth 
acknowledging that there already exists an infrastructure for RPM deployment and use.  
RPMs have been well adapted into CBP and there is established protocol and norms for 
secondary screenings, clearing an alarm, etc. MRDS have no such infrastructure.  More 
importantly, their mobility creates additional complication which do not exist for 
stationary RPMs operating at a site that is heavily controlled and monitored. What 
happens when a MRDS has an alarm? Who picks up the moving target?  How is 
secondary screening handled?  What is the procedure for clearing an alarm? Who has 
jurisdiction?  
It is not the scope of this work to create or write institutional policy for MRDS. 
However, it is worth acknowledging that investing into MRDS means than investing into 
manufacturing. It also means investing into procedures and training. MRDS are an 
effective technology from a strategic point of view. However, to remain viable in 
application some care must be given to tactics, policy, and jurisdiction.  
MRDS will require a means to identify targets quickly and bring them to a stop. 
This may mean coordination with local law enforcement or an MRDS team that has the 
capability to conduct a stop. Secondary screening could be conducted by a second team, 
local law enforcement, or the primary MRDS team. If secondary screening is conducted 
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by local law enforcement, that will mean making handheld detector equipment available 
and providing training on its use. While handheld detector software has had to become 
user-friendly in a post-9/11 world, this can be a large barrier if an MRDS has a large 
deployment area across multiple jurisdictions.  
Fortunately, the FBI has already done a lot of work to create a federally lead, 
intelligence driven response to nuclear or radiological crisis in their annual Marble 
Challenge. Expanding on the work there, which is already established procedure, may be 
worth exploring in response to a true-positive alarm, or even during joint operations to 
monitor local highways. Alternatively, this could simply be handled through an interior 
federal investigative agency, in much the same way that other contraband smuggling 
cases are handled.   
It may be tempting to invest in a hybrid solution, where additional RPMs are 
deployed state-side along major thoroughfares or choke points. While this may have 
value in interdicting opportunists or general deterrence, this work demonstrates that 
effective interdiction against an intelligent adversary requires a discrete detection 
system. MRDS are effective because of their ability to operate discretely.  RPMs are not 
discrete. RPMs underperform because they can be anticipated and circumvented, not 
because of their network position.  
Investing into additional RPMs will aid against opportunist adversaries, because 
the opportunist (by definition) has a limited capability to detect and avoid RPMs.  
Against an intelligent and capable adversary, further investment into RPMs will have a 
negligible impact on adversary success until they become ubiquitous.  However, this is 
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not a practical solution for the real world where illegal entry points can be manufactured 
and discovered by entrepreneurial adversaries.  MRDs have a measurable impact on 
adversary success without being omnipresent, they can be surged to protect a target 
when actionable intelligence is present, and they can be operated in a discrete fashion 
that will hinder the adversary’s ability to make rational choices about successful 
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Sample Input Deck 
C---------------------------------------- 
C 
C   SHIELD program version 26.0.0.0 
C   Developed By Nuclear Security Science & Policy Institute (NSSPI) 
C   Saved Input file 




C   run_number, HEU_quality, Container_type 
        100000;         1.5;              3; 
C 
C (print control) Title, Summary, Input, Bin, Routes, Links, Nodes 
                      1;       1;     1;   1;      1;     1;     1; 
C 
C Behavior mode (1 for Step by Step, 0 for intelligent), routes selection num, seed value 
method, seed value 
                                                      0;                   5;                 0;           
C 
C Total dataset number 
10; 
C Layer Num, Min nPD lim, Max nPD lim; 
1;       0.1;   0.9; 
2;       0.1;   0.9; 
3;       0.1;   0.9; 
4;       0.1;   0.9; 
5;       0.1;   0.9; 
6;       0.1;   0.9; 
7;       0.1;   0.9; 
8;       0.1;   0.9; 
9;       0.1;   0.9; 
10;       0.1;   0.9; 
C 
C Node number, initial node, end node 
            8;            1;        8; 
C 
C - Node   1, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
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N;                      1;             0.4;        0.6;                    1;    2;           0.2;    1;        port;  
Houston;     29.7631;    -95.3631; 
C - Pathway from node   1, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 
actual nPD, description 
P;                                    1;        2;     2;   100.00;    2;             0.5;        0.7;           1; 
C 
C - Node   2, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
N;                      2;             0.3;        0.6;                    3;    3;           0.5;    2;City airport; 
New York;     40.7142;    -74.0064; 
C - Pathway from node   2, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 
actual nPD, description 
P;                                    2;        3;     3;   200.00;    4;           0.6; 0.45;           h; 
P;                                    2;        4;     3;   200.00;    4;           0.3;        0.5;           h; 
P;                                    2;        5;     3;   200.00;    4;           0.5;        0.5;           h; 
C 
C - Node   3, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
N;                      3;             0.35;        0.5;                    1;    3;           0.5;    3;       train;Los 
Angeles;     34.0522;   -118.2428; 
C - Pathway from node   3, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 
actual nPD, description 
P;                                    3;        6;     4;   100.00;    2;          0.4;0.55;           a; 
C 
C - Node   4, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
N;                      4;             0.7;        0.3;                    1;    3;             1;    3;       truck;  
Beijing;     39.9100;    116.4000; 
C - Pathway from node   4, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 
actual nPD, description 
P;                                    4;        7;     4;   100.00;    2;             0.6;        0.5;           a; 
C 
C - Node   5, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
N;                      5;             0.6;        0.4;                    1;    3;             0;    4;        ship;    
Tokyo;     35.6833;    139.7667; 
C - Pathway from node   5, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 
actual nPD, description 
P;                                    5;        8;     5;   100.00;    2;             0.65;        0.5;           a; 
C 
C - Node   6, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
N;                      6;             0.8;0.6;                    1;    3;             1;    5;     airport;  Chicago;     
41.8500;    -87.6500; 
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C - Pathway from node   6, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 
actual nPD, description 
P;                                    6;        8;     6;   100.00;    2;          0.4;        0.5;           a; 
C 
C - Node   7, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
N;                      7;             0.8;        0.6;                    1;    3;           0.3;    5;     airport;    
Paris;     48.8742;      2.3470; 
C - Pathway from node   7, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 
actual nPD, description 
P;                                    7;        8;     6;   100.00;    2;             0.5;          0.5;           a; 
C 
C - Node   8, node number, perceived nPD, actual nPD, forward paths number, time, 
redirect_prob,group, description, location,    latitude,   longitude, 
N;                      8;             0.5;        0.6;                    0;    3;           0.2;    6;     airport;     
Roma;     41.9000;     12.5000; 
C - Pathway from node   8, initial node, end node, group, distance, time, perceived nPD, 




C   End of Input file 
C 
C----------------------------------------- 
